I graduated from Mathematical Engineering at Universidad de Chile in 2000. I did my Ph.D. in Economics at the University of Minnesota, finishing in 2006. My research interests are Mechanism Design, Game Theory and Industrial Organization.
At the undergrad level, I teach a course on Industrial Organization. At a grad level, I usually teach a core course of Microeconomic Theory and a Mechanism Design course.
Master's students: Gonzalo Cisternas (currently Ph.D. student at Princeton University), Jorge Lemus (currently Ph.D. student at Northwestern University), Jorge Catepillán (currently Ph.D. student at Northwestern University), Carlos Ramírez (currently Ph.D. student at Carnegie Mellon University) and Jorge Vásquez (currently Ph.D. student at University of Wisconsin)
The Role of Optimal Threats in Auction Design (joint with Vasiliki Skreta). Journal of Economic Theory 144(2), 884-897.
A Note on Optimal
Allocation Mechanisms (joint with Vasiliki Skreta) .
Economics Letters 102(3), 169-173.
. Economics Letters 102(3), 169-173.
On the Planner’s Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design (joint with José Correa). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 5814 (2009), pp. 72--84. (Proceedings of SAGT 2009).
(See also the Companion Paper "Competition with Asymmetric Switching Costs" by the same authors)