Seminario ISCI OM&A: “Stable Matching with Contingent Priorities”

Seminario ISCI OM&A:  “Stable Matching with Contingent Priorities”
Presenta: Ignacio Ríos Uribe
Fecha: Jueves 16 de mayo de 2024
Horario: 13:30 – 14:30 hrs
Lugar: Beauchef 851, Sala de Consejo. Piso 4
Inscripciones en: Seminario ISCI OM&A  
Organiza: Instituto Sistemas Complejos de Ingeniería (ISCI)

Abstract: We study stable matching problems under contingent priorities, whereby the clearinghouse prioritizes some agents based on the allocation of others. Using school choice as a motivating example, we first introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to prioritize applicants with siblings assigned to the same school and match them together. We provide a series of guidelines to implement these contingent priorities and introduce two novel concepts of stability that account for them.

We study some properties of the corresponding mechanisms, including the existence of a stable assignment under contingent priorities, its incentive properties, and the complexity of finding one if it exists.
Moreover, we provide mathematical programming formulations to find such stable assignments whenever they exist.

Finally, using data from the Chilean school choice system, we show that our framework can significantly increase the number of siblings assigned together while having no large effect on students without siblings.