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Ciclo seminarios CEA-MIPP / Nicolas Riquelme, U. de los Andes

12:00 horas, Sala Consejo, Beauchef 851 (cuarto piso).

Ciclo de seminarios que reúne a destacados académicos que introducen a la audiencia a investigaciones relevantes en el área de economía cubriendo una amplia variedad de temas.

Presenta: Nicolas Riquelme, profesor de la Escuela de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad de Los Andes.

Tema: “Information exchange through secret vertical contracts”.

Abstract

We study a common agency problem in which two downstream firms, who are local monopolists and receive private demand signals, offer secret menus of two-part tariff contracts to their common supplier. While direct communication is not possible, they may still exchange their information through signal-contingent menus of vertical contracts. We show that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in which information is transmitted, and downstream firms obtain nearly the first-best industry surplus. The use of both fixed charges and slotting fees is necessary for such a result. Our results suggest that efficient collusion with market allocation may not necessitate direct communication.Organizan: Centro de Economía Aplicada (CEA) e Instituto Milenio MIPP.

Más información aquí

Contacto y confirmación asistencia: Olga Barrera / obarrera@dii.uchile.cl