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Ciclo seminarios CEA-MIPP / Daniel Habermacher, UAndes

12:00 horas, Sala de Consejo, Beauchef 851 (4to piso).

Invitado: Daniel Habermacher, Universidad de Los Andes.

“Policy-advising competition and endogenous lobbies”.

Organizan: Centro de Economía Aplicada (CEA) e Instituto Milenio MIPP.

Abstract

We investigate competition between experts with different motives. A policy-maker has to implement a policy and can either acquire information herself or hire a biased but well-informed expert. We show that the policy-maker delegates the decision to the expert if the latter cares sufficiently about the policy. In particular, the expert acts as an advisor (positive price) if her bias is small and as a lobbyist (negative price) otherwise. We then introduce an unbiased expert who cares about her reputation. We show that competition may force the biased expert to turn lobbyist. Finally, the effect of competition on social welfare depends on whether the policy is more important for society than for the policy-maker. In particular, if society deems the policy not important, welfare improvements from hiring the unbiased expert may arise when her expertise is low.

Más información aquí

Contacto y confirmación asistencia: Olga Barrera / obarrera@dii.uchile.cl