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Ciclo seminarios CEA-MIPP / Alfonso Montes, Université de Cergy-Pontoise

12:00 horas, Sala Consejo, Beauchef 851 (cuarto piso).

Presenta: Alfonso Montes, Postdoctoral Fellow at Thema Laboratoire Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

Tema: “Bayesian Persuasion With Costly Information Acquisition”.

Abstract

We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which the receiver can gather independent information about the state at a uniformly posterior-separable cost. We show that the sender provides information that prevents the receiver from gathering independent information in equilibrium. When the receiver faces a lower cost of information, her `threat’ of gathering independent information increases, thus decreasing the sender’s power to persuade. A lower cost of information can also hurt the receiver because the sender may provide strictly less information in equilibrium. Finally, we propose a solution method that can be used to solve our model in specific applications.

Organizan: Centro de Economía Aplicada (CEA) e Instituto Milenio MIPP.

Más información aquí

Contacto y confirmación asistencia: Olga Barrera / obarrera@dii.uchile.cl