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Ciclo seminarios CEA – Instituto Milenio MIPP

12:00 horas vía Zoom.

Invitado: Jorge Alé Chilet, Bar-Ilan University

Tema: “Colluding Against Environmental Regulation”, en coautoría con Cuicui Chen, State University of New York at Albany; Jing Li, MIT Sloan School of Managemen, y Mathias Reynaert, Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR.

Abstract
We study collusion among firms in response to imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms improve market profits by shading pollution and evade noncompliance penalties by shading jointly. We quantify the welfare effects of alleged collusion among three German automakers to reduce the size of diesel exhaust fluid (DEF) tanks, an emission control technology used to comply with air pollution standards. We develop a structural model of the European automobile industry (2007–2018), where smaller DEF tanks create more pollution damages, but improve buyer and producer surplus by freeing up valuable trunk space and reducing production costs. We find that choosing small DEF tanks jointly reduced the automakers’ expected noncompliance penalties by at least hundreds of millions of euros. Antitrust and noncompliance penalties would reach between 1.46 and 7.37 billion euros to remedy the welfare damages of the alleged collusion.

Inscripciones aquí

Luego de la inscripción, recibirá un correo electrónico de confirmación con información para unirse al seminario web.

Organizan: Centro de Economía Aplicada (CEA) e Instituto Milenio MIPP.

Contacto: Olga Barrera / obarrera@dii.uchile.cl