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Seminario Instituto Sistemas Complejos de Ingeniería (ISCI) / Daniel Schwartz, académico de Ingeniería Industrial


Auditorio República 779 (entrada por Domeyko 2338, Santiago)

Invitado: Daniel Schwartz, académico Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile

Título de la conferencia: “Opting In to Prosocial Incentives”

Prior work has demonstrated that prosocial incentives – where individuals’ effort benefits a charitable organization – can be more effective than standard incentive, particularly when the monetary value of the incentive is low. Yet it is unknown whether prosocial incentives are effective in contexts in which people can easily avoid them. We examine the impact of prosocial incentives on people’s participation decisions using a field experiment involving a recycling campaign and a large-scale online field experiment that varied the incentive type and size. Across studies, we found that when possible, people avoided activities and jobs that involved prosocial incentives. Even more, we found that people were less likely to recycle or work when incentives involved an option to donate their earnings. Our results identify the limits to prosocial incentives, and have implications for contract design and policies aimed at improving selection, recruitment, and effort.

Almuerzos previa inscripción desde las 13:15

Consultas: seminarios@isci.cl