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Ciclo seminarios Management Science


13:30 – 14:25 horas, Sala Asamblea, Beauchef 851, 4to piso, Santiago

Invitado: Peng Sun, Profesor de The Fuqua School of Business de Duke University

Título de la conferencia: “Optimal Contract with Dynamic Monitoring”

A principal hires an agent to reduce the arrival rate of adverse events over an infinite time horizon in a continuous time setting.  Effort is private information and costly to the agent.  In addition to monetary payments to induce effort, the principal may monitor the agent, which guarantees effort but is costly to the principal.  We study the schedule to monitor the agent under the optimal contract.

Organizan: Ingeniería Industrial U. Chile e Instituto Sistemas Complejos de Ingeniería (ISCI)

Contacto: Pamela Tapia / ptapia@dii.uchile.cl

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