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Ciclo seminarios CEA – MIPP

13:00 horas, Sala Consejo, Beauchef 851, Torre Oriente (4to piso)

El Centro de Economía Aplicada (CEA) y el Instituto Milenio para la Investigación en Imperfecciones de Mercado y Políticas Públicas (MIPP) de la Universidad de Chile invitan a su ciclo de seminarios programados para el segundo semestre del año.

Invitado: Nageeb Ali, Pennsylvania State University

Título de la conferencia: “Conventions and Coalitions in Repeated Games”

Abstract
This paper develops a theory of repeated games for settings where coalitions may choose actions. We assume that members of coalitions cannot commit to long-run be- havior (on and o↵ the path) but coalitions can engage in short-term deviations. Players are farsighted and recognize that behavior is history-dependent. A convention reflects players’ shared understanding of how history influences future behavior. We say that a convention is stable if at every history, no coalition of players can find profitable one- shot deviations. We prove that when monitoring is perfect in both non-transferable and transferable utility games, stable conventions can implement any payo↵ that is feasible and strictly individually rational so long as players are arbitrarily patient. Accordingly, coalitional deviations do not refine behavior beyond the folk theorem for sub-game perfect equilibria. By contrast, if members of a deviating coalition can transfer utility to each other secretly, a stable convention implements payo↵s only within the -core of the stage- game, and all such outcomes can be implemented as players become arbitrarily patient. We use these results to interpret how legal institutions can shape the behavior of individ- uals and coalitions through their expectations of future behavior, and why laws may be undermined when transfers are secret.

Se solicita a los interesados confirmar asistencia, con el fin de coordinar la solicitud de refrigerios.

Confirmaciones: Olga Barrera / obarrera@dii.uchile.cl