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Ciclo seminarios CEA – MIPP


13:00 horas, Sala Asamblea, Ingeniería Industrial, Torre Oriente (Beauchef 851, 4to piso, Santiago)

El Centro de Economía Aplicada (CEA) y el Instituto Milenio para la Investigación en Imperfecciones de Mercado y Políticas Públicas (MIPP) de la Universidad de Chile invitan a su ciclo de seminarios programados para el primer semestre del año.

Invitado: Thomas Wiseman, Department of Economics University of Texas at Austin

Título de la conferencia: “Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game”

We study stable outcomes in a one-to-one matching market with firms and workers. The model endogenizes how transferable utility is within a match: when a firm-worker pair is matched, they play an infinite-horizon discounted dynamic game with one-sided, observable effort. Partners’ types are complementary in determining the maximal feasible payoffs. In our setting, the classic result that with complementary types stable matchings are positively assortative does not hold. Increasing the quality of a match harms dynamic incentives, because a firm cannot credibly threaten to fire a worker who is productive even with low effort. Thus, firms may prefer lower-type workers who will exert more effort. Our analysis suggests a new interpretation of efficiency wages: committing to pay a high wage can improve effort incentives indirectly by making the firm more willing to walk away.

Más información

Confirmaciones: Olga Barrera / obarrera@dii.uchile.cl