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models and algorithms for stackelberg games with incomplete information
Stackelberg games, where one player, the leader, selects its action first and the second player decides its optimal strategy knowing the actions of the leader, is a natural problem for various security domains. This framework however assumes the leader has an accurate model of the adversary.In this talk I'll present recent work we have done in which we develop efficient fixed-integer programs and algorithms to solve situations where there is imperfect information about the adversary, its reward structure, or decision process. This work lead to the development of a system to aid in the randomization of security patrols at the Los Angeles International Airport.
Joint work with Milind Tambe, Sarit Kraus, Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan Pearce, Janusz Marecki, Manish Jain, James Pita.