

Este curso explora temas avanzados en teoría de juegos y economía de la información. El curso cubrirá resultados clásicos así como temas de frontera. El curso está diseñado para estudiantes de Magíster o Doctorado con interés en teoría microeconómica. Teoría y aplicaciones serán discutidas. Los requisitos son Microeconomía I y Economía Industrial o Microeconomía II.

Parte del material puede encontrarse en Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) y Mailath and Samuelson (2006). La siguiente es una lista tentativa de los tópicos a cubrir:

Juegos globales y coordinación Carlson and Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998), Angeletos and Pavan (2007)

Juegos repetidos, colusión entre firmas, insurance, y contratos implícitos Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), Kocherlakota (1996), Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007), Athey and Bagwell (2001), Athey and Bagwell (2008), Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002), Levin (2003), Mailath and Morris (2002)

Normas sociales y auto-gobierno Greif (1993), Kandori (1992), Ellison (1994), Ghosh and Ray (1996), Dixit (2003), Dixit (2006), Dellarocas (2003)

Reputación, marcas, y negociaciones Kreps and Wilson (1982), Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982), Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Tirole (1996), Ely and Välimäki (2003), Tadelis (1999), Tadelis (2002), Abreu and Gul (2000)

Redes Sociales y Económicas Jackson (2008), Coleman (1990), Granovetter (2005), Jackson and Wolinski (1996), Raub and Weesie (1990), Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2010)

Transmisión de Información y Persuasión Crawford and Sobel (1982), Battaglini (2002), Morris (2001), Dessein (2002), Rayo and Segal (2008), Kamenica and Gentzkow (2009), Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008)

Otros tópicos Licitaciones (Myerson 1981, Milgrom 2004), Equilibrio y aprendizaje (Fudenberg and Levine 1993), Economía del comportamiento (Fudenberg and Levine 2006, DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004, Gul and Pesendorfer 2008)

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